We study a coalition formation game with externalities where each agent's payoff depends on the entire partition (see, e.g., Bloch (1996) ). As in Bloch (1996) and Ray and Vohra (1999), we assume that coalitions form sequentially and once a coalition forms, it cannot dissolve nor can its members forge new coalitions with the rest of the agents. However, instead of an exogenously given protocol, we use a "bidding mechanism" (see, e.g., Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2002)) to endogenously determine proposers. This mechanism also generates transfers among the agents. We show that such a mechanism facilitates the attainment of efficiency; in particular, a dynamically efficient Markov perfect equilibrium always exists. Nevertheless, there are games that also admit inefficient equilibria.
Introduction
In this paper, we study a class of coalition formation problems with externalities, where each agent's payoff depends on how the entire set of agents organize themselves (i.e., the coalition structure). Our main objective is to ascertain which coalitions are going to form and whether efficiency can be obtained. The approach we take is noncooperative as in most of the recent literature 1 . The main distinct feature of our game is that proposers are determined endogenously by a bidding mechanism rather than an exogenously given protocol. We analyze the existence and efficiency of Markov perfect equilibrium in our game.
There has been growing interest in the study of coalition formation in environments with externalities. Among the recent contributions are Bloch (1996) , Ray and Vohra (1999), Gomes and Jehiel (2005) , and Hyndman and Ray (2007) . In Bloch (1996) and Ray and Vohra (1999) , agents make proposals and respond to a given proposal following an exogenously given order and once a coalition forms, its members become inactive and game is played among the remaining agents who are free of commitments. In Bloch (1996) , transfers are not possible and each player's payoff depends solely on the coalition structure that transpires. In contrast, Ray and Vohra (1999) start with partition function games 2 and determine both coalition structure and payoff allocation endogenously.
In Bloch (1996) , a Markov perfect equilibrium may fail to exist and when it does exist, it may be inefficient. Ray and Vohra (1999) establish general existence result of Markov perfect equilibrium in their game but inefficient equilibrium can also emerge. Both Bloch (1996) and Ray and Vohra (1999) argue that the inability for the agents to renegotiate any established agreement is a source of inefficiency. More recent work of Gomes and Jehiel (2005) and Hyndman and Ray (2007) allows renegotiation 3 . Moreover, agents cumulate payoffs as the game is played (see also Konishi and Ray (2003) ). Another common feature shared by Gomes and Jehiel (2005) and Hyndman and Ray (2007) is that proposers are chosen by an exogenously given randomization mechanism. Gomes and Jehiel (2005) assume that proposers are able to make unlimited upfront transfers to any players in order to induce a coalition to form. Gomes and Jehiel (2005) focus on Markov perfect equilibrium and show that efficiency cannot be guaranteed. Hyndman and Ray (2007) , while permitting withincoalition transfers, rule out the possibility of upfront transfers across coalitions, arguing that such transfers may have adverse effect on efficiency. On the other hand, they consider history-dependent strategies to overcome inefficiency.
Our main objective is to analyze the consequence of endogenously determined proposers. To this end, we start with Bloch's (1996) framework where an agent's payoff is determined solely by the coalition structure. As in Bloch (1996) and Ray and Vohra (1999), we assume that coalitions form sequentially and once a coalition forms, it cannot dissolve nor can its members forge new coalitions with the rest of the agents. However, instead of an exogenously given protocol, we use a "bidding mechanism" to endogenously determine proposers. With such a mechanism agents bid for the right to propose. Naturally, this mechanism also generates transfers among the agents. Thus, in our games, transfers and proposer choices are intertwined, unlike in Gomes and Jehiel (2005) . Moreover, following Gomes and Jehiel (2005) and Hyndman and Ray (2007) , coalition formation is in "real time" and agents cumulate payoffs in every period.
The bidding mechanism that we use to endogenously determine proposers is based on those proposed by Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2000, 2001, and 2002) . In Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2000), agents compete for a public project by submitting bids toward each other. The externalities this project generates depend on who carries out the project. The agent with the highest net bid (the difference between his total bids to others minus others' total bids to him) pays his or her bids and carries out the project. Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2002) also propose another similar mechanism in which agents place bids directly on a set of projects in order to choose one among this set 4 . In our context, each agent first chooses a coalition to which he or she belongs and then agents bids for the right to propose. The agent with the highest net bid becomes the proposer and proposes the coalition he or she has chosen. The members of this coalition then respond sequentially to this proposal as in most of literature on endogenous coalition formation. If acceptance is unanimous, the proposer pays his bids and the coalition forms.
It turns out that endogenous choice of proposers has important implications. 4 All Nash equilibria are efficient in both mechanisms. Mutuswami et al. (2004) designed a similar mechanism to tackle inefficiency in public goods provision. Porteiro (2007) extends the bidding mechanism to a dynamic setting in which agents cooperate in the production and allocation of a good with external effects. A proposer is chosen by a bidding mechanism. Then the proposer pays his/her bids and proposes an allocation that is implemented if all players unanimously accept it. In case of a rejection, the negotiation process is started again. Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001) employ a bidding mechanism to implement the Shapley value in coalitional games with transferable utilities. First, a proposer is determined by bidding and then the proposer pays his or her bids and proposes a payoff allocation for the entire set of players. In case of rejection, the proposer is removed and the game is player among the remaining players.
First, existence of pure strategy Markov perfect equilibrium can be established even when renegotiation is not permitted, which is in contrast to Bloch (1996) . More importantly, our coalition formation game admits an efficient equilibrium. Hyndman and Ray (2007) argue that upfront across-coalition transfers have two main flaws. Firstly, in real life agents may face liquidity constraints. Secondly, such transfers as in Gomes and Jehiel (2005) can have perverse effect on efficiency 5 . We acknowledge that upfront transfers may not always be possible 6 . However, the undesirable effects of transfers are mitigated in our framework. Our positive result concerning the existence of efficient Markov perfect equilibrium stems from the fact that our bidding mechanism generates proposers and transfers simultaneously and jointly. Nevertheless, not all news is good. It is possible for our coalition formation game to admit inefficient equilibrium under certain circumstances, indicating our bidding mechanism (and hence upfront transfer determined jointly with proposers) cannot guarantee efficiency.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model of sequential coalition formation. We then discuss the existence and efficiency properties of the game in Section 3. In Section 4, to illustrate our results, several examples from the literature are revisited in our game framework. Finally, we conclude this paper and discuss some extensions in Section 5.
The Model

Preliminaries
We consider a simple coalition formation problem with externalities. Formally, let N = {1, ..., n} be the finite set of players or agents. A coalition S is a nonempty subset of N . A partition/coalition structure is a collection of coalitions
Let Π be the set of all partitions. We assume that each partition is associated with a unique payoff vector:
We take the view that such a vector specifies the baseline payoffs. Transfers are 5 Hyndman and Ray (2007) illustrate this by an example in which the introduction of upfront transfers generates inefficiency at every state while inefficiency persists only at some state in the absence of upfront transfers.
6 See footnote 8 for more discussions. 7 See also Bloch (1996) and Gomes and Jehiel (2005) .
made possible by our bidding mechanism 8 . If members of a coalition cooperate by signing an agreement, then precise definition of such an agreement is important. Agreements can be divided into two main types: renegotiable agreement (RA), which is allowed to be dissolved or renegotiated after it is signed (see, e.g., Gomes (2005) and Hyndman and Ray (2007) ), and permanent agreement (PA) or non-renegotiable agreement, under which a coalition can never break-up, admit new members or merge with other coalitions. In this paper, all agreements are permanent. Players who have signed an agreement are called committed players, and all the others are called uncommitted players with one exception: If there is only one player who is free of commitment, according to the PA assumption, he or she has to stay alone. In this paper, such player is considered as committed.
The dynamic game
As in most of the literature, our process of coalition formation is modeled as an infinite horizon dynamic game. Time is discrete (t = 0, 1, 2, · · · ). Each period is characterized by time t and a state a, which is described by a partition and a set of committed players. Note that a partition is associated with a vector of baseline payoffs. Formally, state a is a tuple (T, π), where (1) T is the set of all committed players at a; (2) π is the partition/coalition structure on the set of all players at a.
Let Z be the set of states. Given the specification of the game, it is easy to see that Z is a finite set. At the very beginning of the game (t = 0), all players are free of commitment. Coalitions form sequentially. In contrast to Bloch (1996) where uncommitted players obtain zero payoffs, we allow all players to receive their per-period payoffs specified by [u i (π)] i∈N , given the current coalition structure π.
Players discount their future payoffs using a common factor δ ∈ (0, 1). 8 As discussed by Hyndman and Ray (2007) , in real life situations, individuals may face liquidity constraints. As mentioned by Gomes and Jehiel (2005) , allowing upfront transfers rules out capital market imperfections. To circumvent this, each agent in their model is assumed to have large enough endowment. Once can also take advantage of the permanent agreement assumption. For instance, instead of offering lump-sum transfers, per-period transfer will be signed within the contract; that is, the proposer promises to make payments to other players on a per-period basis at the same time he or she commits to join a coalition permanently.
Moves and paths
When a coalition forms, the system of the game moves from one state to another. A move from state a to state b induced by the formation of a coalition S is described by a S − → b. Members in S are called movers. Each state that is reachable from state a by forming a coalition among a subset of uncommitted players is called an achievable state of a. Let F (a) denote the set of all achievable states from a. Let K(a) be the set of all uncommitted players at a 9 , then F (a) is described as
is a subset of F (a) including all achievable states with player i being one of the movers.
For an n-player game, a path starting from a state a 0 , denoted by P (a 0 ), is a sequence of states, i.e., P (a 0 ) = {a 0 , a 1 , ..., a k , ...}. We call P (a 0 ) a feasible path if
be the set of all feasible paths starting from a state a ∈ Z.
The negotiation mechanism
A negotiation mechanism governs the way agents negotiate. In the existing literature, several different negotiation mechanisms have been studied. Broadly speaking, a negotiation mechanism usually comprises three parts: generating a proposer, the proposer making an offer, and responders accepting or rejecting the offer. In Bloch (1996) , for example, a proposer is chosen among uncommitted players according to an exogenously given rule of order. This proposer offers to form a coalition among a subset of uncommitted players who then respond sequentially to this proposal. The coalition forms if there is unanimous consent. Gomes (2005) , Gomes and Jehiel (2005) , and Hyndman and Ray (2007) , on the other hand, employ a probabilistic protocol to randomly choose a proposer among the entire set of players as agreements are renegotiable. After the proposer is determined, he or she makes an offer to a subset of players in order to form a coalition. If transfers are permitted (see, e.g., Gomes (2005) , Gomes and Jehiel (2005) , and Hyndman and Ray (2007)), the proposer declares, at the same time, transfers or side-payments to other agents. The set of responders is also called the "approval committee", which can differ from the proposed coalition. In Gomes and Jehiel (2005) , for example, all agents whose memberships are altered because of the formation of the proposed coalition are included in the "approval committee". One of the major differences between Gomes and Jehiel (2005) , and Hyndman and Ray (2007) is that Gomes and Jehiel (2005) allow transfers to be made among members of the entire approval committee, thereby permitting transfers across coalitions, while Hyndman and Ray (2007) restrict transfers within the proposed coalition.
In this paper, the negotiation mechanism is divided into the following three stages.
The announcing stage
In this stage, each player simultaneously announces a state (and hence a coalition, if any) that he or she is going to propose if he or she is chosen as the proposer
10
. We call such a state an announced state. Each uncommitted player (i ∈ K(a)) is allowed to announce an achievable state with he or she being one of the movers. Unlike Bloch (1996) , where committed players have to literally "leave the game", we allow them to participate the negotiation with certain restrictions. In the announcing stage, each committed player announces the current state. Let Υ = [η 1 , ..., η n ] be the set of all the announced states where η i denotes player i's announced state and
Before the bidding stage starts, Υ is revealed to all players.
The bidding stage
In this stage, players bid for the right to propose through a bidding mechanism that is based one those introduced by Pérez-Castrillo • If |Ω(m)| = 1, the player with the highest net bid and is willing to be the proposer becomes the proposer.
• If |Ω(m)| > 1, the proposer is randomly chosen with equally probabilities among members in the set Ω(m).
• If Ω(m) = ∅ and |Ω| = 1, the player with the highest net bid becomes the proposer.
• If Ω(m) = ∅ and |Ω| > 1, the proposer is randomly chosen with equally probabilities among members in the set Ω.
Let P α represent the probability that a player α is chosen as the proposer. According to the bidding mechanism, P α is a function of the net bids.
The responding stage
Our bidding mechanism generates not only a proposer but also the proposer's bids which serve as transfers from the proposer to the rest of the players conditional on the acceptance of his or her proposal. Note that the proposer and the transfers among the players are determined simultaneously and jointly, which is in contract, for example, to Gomes and Jehiel (2005) . Suppose player α is the proposer, the proposal is then given by Γ
. In the responding stage, responders sequentially decide whether to accept or to reject the proposal. Note that the order of the responding sequence is irrelevant. All movers are considered as responders or members of the "approval committee". Let RS(a, η α ) be the "approval committee" for the proposal Γ α . It is given by
The proposal Γ α is considered accepted if there is unanimous consent. As a result, the system of the game moves to η α with the formation of the corresponding coalition and transfers ((β 
Strategies and equilibrium
Histories and strategies
In our dynamic game, as long as there are uncommitted players, each period contains three stages: the announcing stage, the bidding stage, and the responding stage. To facilitate subsequent definition of Markovian strategies, we introduce the following definitions of histories in our dynamic game.
• A history h t−1 is a complete record of what has happened up to the beginning of period t. It includes all the announced states, submitted bids and messages, and all the acceptances and rejections in all previous periods.
• determines a state in period t which includes a partition and a set of committed players. The set of histories where it is player i's turn to move is denoted by
The set of all histories is given by
A pure strategy σ i specifies a non-randomized action of i ∈ N for each history
• In the announcing stage, σ
where the action set A i is defined as
• In the bidding stage, σ
• In the responding stage, σ
states, submitted bids and messages in the current period. If player i moves in the responding stage as a responder, θ i includes not only all the announced states, submitted bids and messages in the current period, but also a winning proposal and all the responses that have been made so far. • it depends on h t−1 only through the current state a, (
Markov perfect equilibrium
In this paper, we use Markov perfect equilibrium as the solution concept. A strategy 
Values
In our dynamic game, all players share a common discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1). A strategy profile σ determines a sequences of states, each of which is associated with a per-period payoff for every player. Moreover, a strategy profile also generates a series of transfers as given by the accepted winning proposals. The value function
, is the present value for player i at history h i t , given the strategy profile σ. If σ is a pure Markovian strategy profile, the value function can be simply written as v σ i (a) 13 . Moreover, the value functions for each player at a can be written as
where x σ i (a) is the continuation value of player i at a. Let us illustrate this continuation value with an example. Suppose that given some MPE σ, player i is the proposer with probability 1 and the proposal Γ
) is accepted at a. As a result, the vector of bids (β i j ) j =i is paid and the system of the game moves from a to η i . Thus, the continuation equilibrium value for each player at a is given by:
On the other hand, if the proposal is rejected at a, the continuation value for each player i at a is given by
In the following analysis, we call the continuation value induced by a rejection of the proposal the disagreement value.
Existence and efficiency
The main purpose of this section is to study the existence and efficiency properties of the MPE of our game. In the literature, the existence of equilibrium is usually proved by means of fixed point theorems, such as that of Kakutani (see e.g., Gomes (2005) , Gomes and Jehiel (2005) , and Hyndman and Ray (2007)). As pointed out by Gomes (2005) , allowing for mixed strategies is essential to achieve existence of equilibrium. In other words, in order to show the existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium which is the concern of our study, a different technique is needed. In this section, we combine the tasks of showing the existence and analyzing the efficiency properties of MPE into one by constructing a dynamically efficient pure-strategy MPE in Theorem 3.5. We also observe that inefficient Markov perfect equilibria (e.g., as a result of coordination failure) may coexist with the efficient one.
We begin with some efficiency concepts. Note that since payoffs are effectively transferable in our model, efficiency implies maximization of the aggregate payoff of all players.
where Z(a) is the set of all the states that is achievable from state a through either one step or more steps.
After introducing the above two "static" efficiency concepts, we now turn to some dynamic ones. Note that an equilibrium σ determines a path or a probability distribution over a set of paths. Given an equilibrium σ, any path starting from a that is assigned with a positive probability is called an equilibrium path, denoted by P (σ, a).
Equilibrium σ is dynamically efficient if for any equilibrium path P (σ, a 0 ) starting from the initial state of the entire game a 0 , there does not exist an alternative feasible path from a 0 that yields a higher summation of values of all players at state a 0 than P (σ, a 0 ). Definition 3.4. The equilibrium σ is full dynamically efficient if for any equilibrium path P (σ, a) starting from any state a ∈ Z, there does not exist an alternative feasible path from a that yields a higher summation of values of all players at state a than P (σ, a). Proof. There are three steps in this proof. In the first step, we construct a pure strategy profile σ. We prove, in the second step, that the constructed σ is an MPE.
In the last step, we show that σ is full dynamically efficient. More details of this proof are relegated to the appendix.
Unfortunately, efficiency can not always be guaranteed in our game. Coordination failures do arise under some circumstances (see the three-firm oligopoly game in the next section). For instance, players may overbid for the right to propose 14 .
Since overcoming such a behavior may require coordination among players, inefficient equilibria emerge.
Illustrations
To illustrate the impact of concurrent determination of proposers and transfers by our bidding mechanism, we revisit several examples studied by Bloch (1996) , Gomes and Jehiel (2005) , and Hyndman and Ray (2007) 15 . Example 1 takes after a coalition bargaining game that Gomes and Jehiel (2005) use to demonstrate the possibility of inefficiency in their model. Example 2 is a "failed partnership game". As shown by Hyndman and Ray (2007) , without transfers, inefficiency persists at some state in this failed partnership game. However, further inefficiency problems occur when transfers as suggested by Gomes and Jehiel (2005) are allowed (GJ transfers hereafter). In both examples, GJ transfers seem to act as a source of inefficiencies. In our game framework, however, we show that efficiency can be achieved in these example. Later, we construct an efficient equilibrium for a simple five-player game and a three-firm cartels formation game in a symmetric Cournot oligopoly (both are studied by Bloch (1996) ). Lastly, to illustrate the consistence of inefficient equilibrium in our framework, we construct a coexisting inefficient MPE for the cartels formation game. 
This example is slightly modified from the original version in Gomes and Jehiel (2005) . In particular, payoffs shown above are per-period payoffs 16 . As shown by Gomes and Jehiel (2005) , efficiency can not be achieved in equilibrium. More precisely, if all players are patient enough, none of the states is absorbing and the unique equilibrium is cyclical where all states emerge with positive possibilities. For instance, at x 0 , any two players have incentives to form a coalition as both of them are strictly better-off and expect to extract large amount of transfers from the outsider who eagerly wants to go back to x 0 . At x 1 , player 2 and player 3 are willing to move back to x 0 if player 1 pays them enough amount of transfers. It would seem that GJ transfers are sources of inefficiencies in this example. By introducing the bidding mechanism to jointly determine the proposer and transfers, we construct an efficient MPE for this game 17 . The game starts from the initial state x 0 . After the first round of negotiation, player 2 wins in the bidding stage and signs an agreement to stay alone forever without paying any transfer. In the next round of negotiation, player 1 wins the right to propose and forms a singleton coalition without transfers. Under these two permanent agreements, player 3 has to stay alone permanently as well. Hence, efficiency is achieved in equilibrium.
Example 2: A failed partnership game (Hyndman and Ray, 2007) 
An important feature of this example is that the formation of any two-player partnership always leads to inefficient outcomes. A three-player partnership is trivial since each player obtains zero payoffs. As shown by Hyndman and Ray (2007) , if player 1 forms a "failed partnership" with player 2, as a member of the approval committee, player 1 will forestall the Pareto-improving movement from x 3 to x 0 . The reason is that player 1 anticipates that player 2 and 3 will move together from x 0 to x 1 and this move makes player 1 strictly worse-off. Moreover, inefficiency rises from every initial state in this example if GJ transfers are allowed. Hyndman and Ray (2007) argue that simply allowing across-coalition transfers can create more inefficiency problems. In our framework, it is essential that proposers and transfers are determined jointly and this leads to a positive result: all Markov perfect equi-libria in the new game are efficient (see more details in the appendix). Particularly, in the equilibrium we constructed, the game starts at x 0 , where all three players stay apart. In the first period, player 1 announces to stay alone permanently and she wins in the bidding stage. After her offer is accepted, the singleton coalition forms with zero transfers. In the next period, player 2 who announces never to form any partnership wins the bidding. As a result, the second singleton coalition forms without transfers. Hence, no failed partnership forms in equilibrium.
Example 3: A simple five-player game (Bloch, 1996) 
All other states are assumed to yield payoff 1 to each player. Bloch (1996) uses this example to illustrate that an efficient state with α-stable structure may fail to be achieved in stationary subgame perfect equilibrium. In this example, three states, f 1 , f 4 and h 23 , are associated with α-stable coalition structures and f 4 and h 23 are globally efficient. As shown by Bloch (1996) , however, the unique stationary equilibrium coalition structure is the one associated with the inefficient state f 5 . For instance, the global efficient coalition structure given by h 23 can not be achieved in equilibrium because player 2 and 3 will refuse to form a coalition: They anticipate that player 4 and 5 have incentives to form a coalition afterwards, inducing all other players including player 2 and 3 very low payoffs. This type of inefficiency is caused by the lack of transfers. It is easy to see that both player 4 and player 5 will agree to stay alone permanently at h 23 conditional on receiving enough transfers. In our framework, utilities are transferable via bids and we are able to construct a dynamically efficient MPE (see more details in the appendix). The game starts from a 0 . In the first period, player 2 announces to form a coalition with player 3 and player 2 wins the right to propose. After player 3 accepts the offer, the coalition forms and the bids submitted by player 2 are paid. In the next period, player 1 who announces to form a coalition with player 5 obtains the proposing power and player 5 accepts the offer. As a result, the coalition forms and the bids submitted by player 1 are paid. Hence, the global efficient state f 4 is achieved in equilibrium.
Example 4: Cartel formation in a symmetric Cournot oligopoly
In this simple Cournot model, there is a linear demand function for a homogeneous product and each firm has a constant marginal cost c. The inverse demand function is given by P = α−βQ, where Q is the aggregate output level. The production costs for a firm i is given by C i = cq i . Given a coalition structure π m = {S 1 , S 2 , ..., S m }, the Cournot per-period profits for each cartel is given by
By assuming that members in each cartel share the profits equally, the Cournot per-period profits for each firm i in a cartel with r members is given by
The game starts with n identical free-standing firms. By assuming that all agreements are permanent (i.e., a cartel is forbidden to break-up or expand), Bloch (1996) shows that firms have incentives to commit to stay alone and wait for other firms to form cartels. In his model, the grand coalition cannot form in equilibrium if the number of firms in the market is sufficiently large and all firms are patient enough. For example, if there are six firms in the market, in equilibrium, the first firm (specified by an exogenously given order) chooses to stay alone and the other five firms form a cartel the initial number of firms is high enough (n 43) and all firms are patient enough, the grand coalition is formed in any SPE.
In our framework, each n-firm (n 3) cartel formation game admits an efficient 18 That is, if n = 6, the equilibrium coalition structure is π * = {T * , {j}}, where the size of T * is five.
MPE where a n-firm cartel forms after the first round of negotiation. However, we also observe that coordination failure may occur in some equilibrium. For instance, in the bidding stage players may "overbid". In the appendix, we study a three-firm game (a similar analysis can always be applied to any n-firm (n > 2) game.). Both an efficient MPE and an inefficient one are constructed.
Conclusion
In this paper we explore the implications of endogenously determined proposers in a sequential coalition formation problems with externalities. We show that our game admits a pure-strategy, full dynamically efficient Markov perfect equilibrium. Our game resembles those of Bloch (1996) and Ray and Vohra (1999) Table 1 .
One important assumption of our study is that all agreements are permanent/nonrenegotiable. It simplifies our analysis and enables us to focus on the effects of endogenously determined proposers. Nevertheless, this assumption is compatible with efficiency in our framework. In future studies, it will be valuable to introduce renegotiable agreements into our framework.
While our game always admits an efficient equilibrium, inefficient equilibria may still exist. For instance, as we show in the three-firm cartel formation game if there are no less than two players who overbid, coordination failure will give rise to inefficient equilibrium. Another issue in our model, which is also common in the literature, is the multiplicity of equilibria. One way to resolve these problems is to replace the simultaneous bidding mechanism with a sequential one. We shall explore this sequential bidding mechanism in a separate research project. In the following proof, we assume that n 3. We omit the proof for the two-player case. To simplify the notations, we use G K (a) to represent a subgame with an initial node a which contains K(= |K(a)|) uncommitted players. We begin with defining a subgame G 2 (a). Figure 2 gives a simplified game tree of G 2 (a). and players are all committed in each achievable states. In the following analysis, two uncommitted players are called player k and player w, and two achievable states are labeled b and d respectively.
Step one: Construction In this step, we construct a pure Markovian strategy profile σ. We begin with the construction for a subgame G 2 (a). We then construct strategies for a subgame G K (a) whose initial node has K(> 2) uncommitted players by assuming that all the strategies for every subgame whose initial node has K − 1 uncommitted players or less are all constructed. By induction, the strategy profile σ is fully constructed.A subgame G 2 (a) For a subgame G 2 (a), since all players are committed at each achievable state, Z(a) = {b, d}. We divide the set of announced states, Υ, into the following two types.
• A type Υ e set that includes at least one locally efficient state.
• A type Υ −e set that includes no locally efficient state.
We divide the construction for G 2 (a) into two cases:
The announcing stage:
η k (a) = d, η w (a) = d, and η z (a) = a, ∀z ∈ T (a).
The bidding stage:
Since all feasible sets of announced states are divided into two types, we construct a profile of bidding strategies for each type. 
The vector of bids submitted by player w is given by
The bids submitted by any committed player z are given below:
The vector of bids submitted by the other player k are specified as follows:
The responding stage:
Given an uncommitted player α's proposal Γ 
Now consider a committed player z's proposal Γ
0.
21 Recall that we set Γ α (a) = ∅ once some responder rejects the proposal.
CASE B: State b is locally efficient
22
, i.e., i∈N u i (a) > i∈N u i (d).
The announcing stage:
η k (a) = b, η w (a) = b, and η z (a) = a ∀z ∈ T (a).
The bidding stage:
Consider first a type Υ where Y = max 0, 
The vector of bids for player k:
The responding stage:
We construct the strategies for every player at a state a with K uncommitted players, where 3 K n, by assuming that the strategy profile σ related to all states with less than K uncommitted players has been constructed. Therefore, the value for each player at every achievable state of a is defined and is given by v σ i (b) ∀b ∈ F (a), ∀i ∈ N . Before the construction, we define an efficient achievable (EA) state. Let b be an achievable state of a. Given σ, state b is called an
24 Recall that we set Γ α (a) = ∅ once some responder rejects the proposal.
The announcing stage:
Given σ, state e is an efficient achievable state of a and S e is the set of all movers from a to e. State f is achievable from a by forming a coalition among all uncommitted players (a
K(a)
−−→ f ). Each player's announcing strategies are constructed as follows.
The bidding stage:
In this stage, we construct bidding strategies for every possible combination of announced states. To simplify the construction, Υ is divided into the following two types.
• A type Υ e set that includes the efficient achievable state e.
• A type Υ −e set that includes the efficient achievable state e. 
. Player w's vector of bids is given by
W.L.O.G., we pick an uncommitted player, say player q( = w) and construct the bids for player q as functions of bids submitted by other players:
The vector of bids for any player z ∈ T (a):
The vector of bids of any other uncommitted player k ∈ K(a) \ {w, q}: 
The responding stage:
. 26 Recall that we set Γ α (a) = ∅ once some responder rejects the proposal
The part of the strategy profile σ related to each subgame starting from a state with two uncommitted players have been constructed. In addition, the strategy profile related to each subgame starting from a state with K > 2 uncommitted players can be constructed given the strategies for every subgame starting from a state with less than K uncommitted players. By induction, the strategy profile σ for the entire game is fully constructed.
Step two: Markov Perfect Equilibrium
Because of space limitation, we only discuss a sketch of the proof as follows
27
. For a state a, the constructed σ determines a path P (σ, a). We show that the path has the following properties: If state a is associated with two uncommitted players, the path P (σ, a) leads to a locally efficient state; If state a is associated with more than two uncommitted players, every state on P (σ, a) except a is an efficient achievable (EA) state; If all players are patient enough, P (σ, a 0 ) leads to the global efficient state; There is no delay 28 on the path P (σ, a). To prove that σ is an MPE, we need to show that there does not exist any profitable deviation for a player i from σ i when all other players act by following their strategies specified by σ.
In the responding stage, according to σ, each responder always says "Yes" to a proposal offering her no less than her disagreement value and says "No" otherwise. On one hand, a responder may deviate by saying 'Yes' to a proposal offering her less than her disagreement value. On the other hand, a responder may deviate by saying 'No' to a proposal offering her no less than her disagreement value. It is easy to see that none of them is profitable.
Recall that a proposal is composed of a vector of bids and an announced state.
After a player submits her bids, her proposal is determined. The acceptance of this 27 The formal proof of showing the constructed σ is an MPE is upon request. 28 When the system of the game stays at a state for more than one period because of disagreement among players, we call it "delay".
proposal is easy to be verified according to the responding strategies specified by σ. Thus, the continuation value assigned to each player by this proposal can also be verified. We can show that, given σ, each player's proposal assigns a player no more than her disagreement value except the winning proposal, Γ σ w (a, Υ e ), which gives each player a value no less than her disagreement value. In the bidding stage, it is feasible for a player to deviate by changing her message and/or the vector of bids. We can show that each player's net bid specified by σ is always zero, i.e., B σ i (a, Υ) = 0 ∀i ∈ N, ∀Υ, ∀a. Therefore, any player who submits the message '1' is a potential winner (i.e., whose probability to be chosen as a proposer is strictly positive.) and any player who submits the message '0' is a non-winner (i.e., whose probability to be chosen as a proposer is zero. ). It is easy to see that a non-winner can turn herself into a potential winner by simply changing her message from '0' to '1'. Also, if a player decreases her bid to another player slightly, the other player will be turned into a winner with certainty. Nevertheless, given σ, turning a non-winner into a winner without changing this non-winner's proposal can not be profitable for any player since
It is easy to see that the winner specified by σ has no incentives to deviate in any way in the bidding stage. We need to examine, given σ, whether there exists a non-winner who can benefit by changing her bids to turn herself into a winner. With Lemma 1 we can show that such profitable deviation does not exists.
Back to the announcing stage. The set of announced states specified by σ is a type Υ e set. If a player changes her announced state as a deviation from σ, there are two consequences: First, the set of all announced states becomes a type Υ −e set. Second, the type of the set is unchanged. We have shown that all players are indifferent in each type Υ e set and are weakly worse-off in a type Υ −e set given σ.
Hence, there exists no profitable deviation in the announcing stage.
Step three: Efficiency In this step, we prove that the constructed equilibrium σ is full dynamically efficient. Note that from any sate a, the constructed σ determines one equilibrium path: P (σ, a). We prove the following statement: From any state a, there does not exist an alternative feasible path that Pareto-dominates the equilibrium path P (σ, a) .
Firstly, we show that the statement is true for a state associated with two uncommitted players. As we know, the equilibrium path can be described by P (σ, a) = {a, e, ...e, . ..}, where e is a locally efficient state. As shown in Figure  2 , state a and b share the same coalition structure and the same payoff vector. It is easy to see that in both cases (either b or d is locally efficient) a path from a with or without delays 29 should not Pareto-dominate the equilibrium path. Secondly, we show that the statement is true for a state associated with K uncommitted players by assuming that the statement is already true for a state with less than K uncommitted players. As we know, the equilibrium path can be described by P (σ, a) = {a, e 1 , e 2 , . ..}, where e 1 ∈ F (a) is an efficient achievable (EA) state. According to the definition of an EA state,
Thus, the equilibrium path P (σ, a) should not be dominated by a path P = {a, b , ...}, where b ∈ F (a) and {b , ...} = P (σ, b ). Since there are less than K uncommitted players at b , there is no path from b Pareto-dominates the equilibrium path P (σ, b ). Hence, there does not exist any path from a moving directly to b that dominates P . Since b is an arbitrary achievable state of a, P (σ, a) is not dominated by any path from a without delays (staying at a for no more than one period).
Next, we examine whether a path with delays at a can dominate P (σ, a). For an arbitrary path P 1 = {a, b, ...}, we call a path with delays (for one or more periods) at a but sharing the same path with P 1 afterwards P 1 = {a, ..., a, b, . ..}. Suppose the aggregate value at a determined by P 1 is given by i∈N v (a). If there is a delay at a, the aggregate value becomes
There are two cases: i∈N v (a) , then the following must be true
29 That is the system of the game stays at a for more than one period.
From a state with K uncommitted players, there always exists a path on which each uncommitted player sequentially forms a singleton coalition without delays until all players are committed. We call it pathP . The aggregate value at a determined byP is given by i∈N u i (a) 1−δ . Hence, P 1 is dominated by the pathP . Recall that P (σ, a) is not dominated byP . Therefore, P (σ, a) is not dominated by P 1 . To sum up, in both cases, P (σ, a) can not be Pareto-dominated by any path with delays at a.
By induction, we can show that the statement is true for any state associated with uncommitted players. Therefore, the constructed σ is full dynamically efficient. It is also easy to see that when all players are patient enough (δ → 1), the global efficient state is achieved in equilibrium σ.
Lemma 1.Given σ, in the bidding stage at state a, it is not profitable for a player i with an unacceptable proposal to turn herself into a potential winner and her proposal into an acceptable one, if the following Condition (1) is satisfied:
where β i j is specified by σ,
and e is an efficient achievable state at a.
Proof. Given σ, we know that the net bid for each player is always zero, i.e., B i (a, Υ) = 0 ∀i ∈ N ∀ Υ. We also know that a player has to change her bids to turn an unacceptable proposal into an acceptable one in the bidding stage. Let the aggregate bid submitted by player i after she changes her bids be j =iβ i j . We show that the following inequality (2) is a necessary condition if player i changes her bids and also makes herself a potential winner given all the other players follow their strategies specified in σ.
Firstly, it is easy to see that if player i solely increases her bids to other players, (2) must be true. On the other hand, if player i solely decreases her bids to other players, she can never become a winner. Thus, the only case we shall examine is that player i increases her bids to some players and decreases her bids to some other players. Suppose that player i increases her bids to some players by the total amount > 0 and decreases her bids to some other players by the total amount > 0. Thus, player i's new aggregate bid is given by
Since the bids submitted by all other players are unchanged, player i's new net bid should beB i = − . Since she has decreased her bid for at least one player, say player j, player j's new net bid must be positive. Thus, to become a potential winner, player i's net bid must satisfỹ
Therefore, given σ, if a player wants to deviate by changing her bids and also keeps herself as a potential winner, she has to increase the total amount of her bids. Given σ, we shall show that it is not profitable for a player i to deviate by changing her bids to turn her proposal into an acceptable one and herself a potential winner (we call such deviation σ 
For a type Υ e set, C is defined by σ as follows. For a subgame G 2 (a), in CASE
Thus there does not exist a profitable σ • In the announcing stage:
• In the bidding stage: Let Υ • In the responding stage, each responder's strategies for a proposal offered by either player 2 or player 3 are specified as below.
For the proposer α:
For any other responder j ∈ S α \ {α},
Next, we complete the construction of σ, which determines the equilibrium path: • In the announcing stage,
• In the bidding stage, because of the symmetric of the game, we specify the bids for the following sets of announced states. The first one is Υ 
The game starts from the initial state where three players stay alone. Given σ, in the first period, player 2 wins in the bidding stage. She proposes to form a singleton coalition without paying any transfers and herself accepts this proposal.
In the second period, player 1 wins the right to propose and he proposes to stay alone permanently without transfers. Again, he accepts his own proposal. Hence the global efficient state is achieved in equilibrium. Note that this result persists when the common discount factor changes in the range from 0 to 1. The reason is that the initial state is also the global efficient state. the changes of the discount factor will only affect the amount of bids.
(2). Every MPE is dynamically efficient
See the proof in Example 2.
Example 2: Construction of an efficient MPE and proof of efficiency
(1). Construction
This example shares the same simplified game tree as Example 1 (see, Figure 3 • In the announcing stage:
• In the bidding stage:
Let Υ 
• In the announcing stage:
Let Υ For the proposer α:
In this step, we complete the construction of the σ, which determines the equilibrium path: P (σ, x 0 ) = {x 0 , x • In the announcing stage,
• In the bidding stage, because there are too many 
The game starts from the initial state where three players stay alone. Given σ, in 31 There are 36 type Υ e combinations. Each of them can be calculated according to the specification of σ in the previous section.
the first period, player 1 wins in the bidding stage. She proposes to form a singleton coalition without paying any transfers and herself accepts this proposal. In the second period, player 2 wins the right to propose and his proposal is to stay alone permanently without transfers. Again, he accepts his own proposal. Hence the global efficient state where no failed partnership forms is achieved in equilibrium. As in Example 1, the changes of the common discount factor (δ ∈ (0, 1)) have no effect on the efficient outcomes except the amount of bids.
(2). Full efficiency of the game
In the following proof, we show that every MPE of the game is efficient.
Proof. Suppose there is an inefficient equilibrium σ . The initial state where three players stay alone is global efficient. Hence, given σ , some partnership among two or three players must form in equilibrium. In our framework, utilities are transferable. When a partnership forms, there is at least one player who is strictly worse-off than staying at the initial state forever. W.L.G.O. we assume that player k suffers the most because of the formation of the failed partnership. Let v σ k (x 0 ) represent the equilibrium value of player k at x 0 . It must be true that v
. Therefore, player k will be strictly better-off if the formation of the partnership is postponed.
A profitable deviation σ d k is constructed as below. Given σ , suppose the first coalition S (either a singleton coalition or a partnership) forms at time t. Player k must be an uncommitted player before the coalition forms. During the negotiation, she deviates by increasing her bids in total to turn herself into a winner. In the responding stage, player k then rejects her proposal. As a result, the formation of the failed partnership is delayed and player k is strictly better-off.
To sum-up, a profitable deviation always exists if any partnership forms in equilibrium. Therefore, all Markov perfect equilibria of the game must be efficient. We begin our construction with the subgame G 2 (a 23 ). u( {{1, 2}, {3}} ) = (6, 6, 12) u( {{1, 3}, {2}} ) = (6, 12, 6) u( {{1}, {2, 3}} ) = (12, 6, 6) u( {{1, 2, 3}} ) = (9, 9, 9)
(1). Construction
We assume the common discount factor is δ ∈ (0, 1). The dynamically efficient Markov Perfect equilibrium (DEMPE), σ, is constructed as follows. A simplified game tree of the three-firm oligopoly game is presented in Figure 6 .
Because the game is symmetric, we show the construction of the equilibrium for the subgame G 2 (a). It is easy to see that the efficient achievable state at a is f 1 .
The Subgame G 2 (a)
• In the announcing stage: η 1 (a) = f 1 , η 2 (a) = f 1 , η 3 (a) = a.
• In the bidding stage: Let Υ Next, we finish the construction for the game G 3 (a 0 ). Given σ, state e is the efficient achievable state at a 0 .
• In the announcing stage, η 1 (a 3 ) = η 2 (a 3 ) = η 3 (a 3 ) = e.
• In the bidding stage, because of space limitation, we construct the bids for the following four sets of announced states: Υ . Because there are more than one player overbid, decreasing the amount of bids by one player makes no difference to the outcomes. In equilibrium σ , firm 1 firstly commits to stay alone permanently, and in the second period, player 2 and 3 form an irreversible cartel and obtain transfers from firm 1. In σ , three firms share equally at an inefficient state f 3
32
. 32 The proof of showing that σ is an MPE is upon request.
